Ipinapakita ang mga post na may etiketa na remedial law. Ipakita ang lahat ng mga post
Ipinapakita ang mga post na may etiketa na remedial law. Ipakita ang lahat ng mga post

Miyerkules, Setyembre 24, 2014

Did a person commit rape if he had sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old?

Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. (People v. Perez, G.R. No. 182924, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 653, 681.)


In this type of rape, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.

What are the requisites for a charge of rape to prosper?

For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. (People v. Trayco, G.R. No. 171313, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 233, 244)

What is the effect in a charge of murder if there was no evidence of treachery?

Without evident premeditation, and without any evidence to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of treachery in the killing, the accused can only be held liable as principal for the crime of homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

Is it a requirement for witnesses to know the names of the assailants?

Witnesses need not know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the latter’s faces. What is imperative is that, on the basis of their personal knowledge, the witnesses are positive as to the physical identification of the perpetrators. (People v. Sorila, Jr., 578 Phil. 931 [2008]).


Thus, it was sufficient that the witnesses were able to identify the accused in the crime scene and when they took the witness stand. 

Failure to pay the docket fees

Problem:

David M. Wenceslao received a copy of the trial court's Order dismissing his complaint filed on May 14, 2004. On May 17, 2004, Wenceslao filed its notice of appeal within the reglementary period. Wenceslao paid the required docket fees only on October 20, 2004, or late by almost five months. The CA dismissed the appeal.
Was the CA correct in dismissing Wenceslao appeal?

Answer:

Petitioner failed to perfect its appeal.

The rule is that appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the period for taking an appeal. Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the Rules provides that “Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.–An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: xxx (c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41;


Hence, the CA, on its own motion or that of the appellee, may dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees.

An appeal is a statutory privilege not a natural right.

The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.

Grave abuse of discretion

"By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." (DORELCO v. NLRC, G.R. No. 128389 November 25, 1999.)